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TYING NONCOMPETITIVE GOODS 
Hebert Hovenkamp* 
A tying arrangement can help a seller increase its profits by either controlling or exploiting pricing 
irregularities in a secondary market.1  Such tying also benefits consumers by eliminating or reducing the 
impact of double marginalization. Further, tying occasionally limits the substitution of “inefficient” inputs 
for the tying product.  While the double marginalizt on problem is common and serves to justify a wide 
variety of ties, the input substitution problem is too rare and the effects are too ambiguous to determin  
the general legal status of tie-ins.   As a result, input substitution should be ignored as a ground to 
condemn an otherwise lawful tie or to save an otherwis  unlawful one except in the very rare case of clear 
net effects. 
Whether proof, generally or in specific cases, of incremental exploitation of preexisting power should 
itself suffice to condemn tying is a controversial issue.2 Here, we ask how such exploitation—other than 
through price discrimination3—can be aided by a tie, whether the exploitation exce ds that which would 
occur without the tie, and whether any such incremental exploitation is accompanied by other anti- or 
procompetitive features. 
Double Marginalization and  “Reverse Leveraging” 
Consider the monopolist (or cartel) of one product tha is used with a second, complementary product 
that is monopolized by a different firm (or subject to a cartel of oligopoly).  If the producers of these two 
products are unable to coordinate their output the result is likely to be “double marginalization,” whic  
generally results in lower output and higher prices than if the first firm monopolized both products. For 
example, some critics of a proposed divesture of Microsoft's Internet Explorer browser from its Windows 
operating system5 argued that if the two products were sold by different firms, each having significant 
market power, then the combined price of the two would be higher than if they were offered together by a 
single firm.6 
                                                
* Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa. 
1See generally ROGER D. BLAIR &  DAVID L. KASERMAN, LAW AND ECONOMICS OF VERTICAL 
INTEGRATION AND CONTROL (1983); FREDERICK R. WARREN-BOULTON, VERTICAL CONTROL OF 
MARKETS (1978); Meyer Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line Forcing, 55 NW. U. L. REV. 62 (1960). 
2See 9 ANTITRUST ¶ 1710. 
3See 9 ANTITRUST ¶ 1711. 
5See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 
253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001). The government proposed this divestiture and 
the district court accepted the proposal, but the remedy was vacated by the D.C. Circuit.  
 
6See CHRISTINA BOHANNAN &  HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: 
PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION, ch. 2 (N.Y.: Oxford Press, 2011, forthcoming) (on
tying and double marginalization); Richard J. Gilbert & Michael L. Katz, An Economist’s guide to U.S. v. 
Microsoft, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 25 (2001) (“[T]he sum of the operating system andpplication prices set 
by an integrated monopolist will be lower than the sum of those prices when set separately by two 
independent firms each with significant market power.”); Stan J. Liebowitz, An Expensive Pig in a Poke: 
Estimating the Cost of the District Court’s Proposed Breakup of Microsoft, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 727 
(2001); Linda R. Cohen & Roger G. Noll, Intellectual Property, Antitrust and the New Economy, 62 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 453, 457 (2001); John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Monopolization, Innovation, and 
Consumer Welfare, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 367 (2001); see also R. Venkatesh & W. Kamakura, Optimal 
Bundling and Pricing under a Monopoly: Contrasting Complements and Substitutes from Independently 
Valued Proudcts, 76 J. BUS. 211 (2003).  Bundled discounts can lead to the same results – namely, the 
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The double marginalization result occurs only when both products are sold at prices above the 
competitive level.  It can apply in both the vertical ontext, such as when a monopoly manufacturer must
distribute through a monopoly dealer, but also in situations involving complements, such as printers and 
ink cartridges, or hospitals and physicians.4  Indeed, the problem is generally more serious in the 
complementary situations, because often the offerors of complementary products are not in a good 
position to negotiate with one another, while the participants in a vertical chain of distribution barg in 
with each other all the time.1 
Because power is required in both markets, double marginalization is unlikely to be of particular 
concern if the tied product is a commodity such as dry ice or salt.  However, it may produce potent 
savings via tying if the tied product is subject to fixed costs or innovation or manufacturing economies of 
scale that typically result in prices above short run costs.  Double marginalization can occur both when 
the proportions of sales in the two markets is fixed and when it is variable,2 so the consumer welfare 
savings that result from elimination of double marginalization applies to both. 
                                                                                                                                                
profit maximizing price of the bundle is lower than the profit maximizing prices of the goods when they 
are sold separately.  Likely examples are Southeast Mis ouri Hosp. v C.R. Bard, Inc., ___  F.2d ___, 2011 
WL 2201067 (8th Cir. June 8, 2011); Cascade Health Solutions v. Peacehealth, 515 F.3d 973 (9th cir. 
2008). 
 
4 See 3B ANTITRUST ¶ 758, which develops the theory mainly in the vertical integration context. In 
general, as each monopolist of a complement reduces output to its profit-maximizing level, market outp 
for the complementary package goes down further and prices rise further. See W. KIP VISCUSI, JOSEPH E. 
HARRINGTON, JR. &  JOHN M. VERNON, ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 238–241 (4th ed. 
2005); Blair & Kaserman, supra, 31-34; William F. Baxter & Daniel P. Kessler, Toward a Consistent 
Theory of the Welfare Analysis of Agreements, 47 STAN. L. REV. 615, 625 (1995). 
 
In the context of complementary products rather than vertical integration the phenomenon is 
sometimes referred to as the “Cournot complements” problem because it is derived from Cournot’s 
analysis of pricing by firms that produce complements rather than substitutes. See AUGUSTIN A. 
COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH 99–116 
(Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., Macmillan 1897) (1897); see also Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, A Primer on 
Foreclosure, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ch. 33 (Mark Armstrong & Robert H. 
Porter, eds., 2007); Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Francesco Parisi, Substituting Complements, 2 J. 
COMPETITION L. &  ECON. 333 (2006); Francesco Parisi & Ben Depoorter, The Market for Intellectual 
Property: The Case of Complementary Oligopoly, in THE ECONOMICS OF COPYRIGHT: DEVELOPMENTS 
IN RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS 162 (Wendy J. Gordon & Richard Watts eds., 2003); James M. Buchanan 
& Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons, 43 J.L. &  ECON. 1 (2000); Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Harvard, Chicago and Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust Analysis, 55 ANTITRUST 
BULL. 613 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1592476. 
 
1 The problem is particularly prevalent in high technology markets where the degree of interaction 
between products is significant and compatibility con erns limit the range of complementary choices.  See 
BOHANNAN &  HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT,  supra, ch. 1. 
 
2 For example, if a monopoly gasoline refiner is selling to gasoline stations that have formed a cartel 
and are extracting a high markup the refiner can eliminate the markup and benefit both itself and 
consumers, even though different members of the cart l sell different amounts of gasoline. See James L. 
Hamilton & Ibrahim Mqasqas, Double Marginalization and Vertical Integration: New Lessons from 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1785586
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To illustrate, suppose that most authors prefer to have both a dictionary and a thesaurus, and both 
are sold in imperfectly competitive markets, such as an oligopoly. A dictionary costs $10 to make, a 
thesaurus costs $8 to make, and the profit-maximizing price of a bundle is $20. Different firms selling the 
two products would each try to capture the overcharge. For example, the dictionary maker might charge 
$12 on the theory that the thesaurus maker would charge $8. But the thesaurus maker would charge $10 
on the assumption that the dictionary maker would charge $10 as well. That outcome, which would yield 
a package price of $22, is suboptimal for everyone.3 F wer consumers would buy and those that did 
would pay too much. Output for both the dictionary maker and the thesaurus maker would fall below the 
“joint-maximizing” level. In this case consumer welfare would increase if a single firm sold both the 
dictionary and the thesaurus for a package price of $20, which would also be that firm’s profit 
maximizing level. The firm could either package thewo together at a price of $20, or it could sell each 
separately at prices of $12 and $10, respectively, but also bundle them at a discounted price of $20.4 
When a monopolist or oligopolist in one market contemplates the effects of a price cut, it 
calculates the decreased revenue from the lower price against the increased net revenue from a higher 
number of sales.  For instance, the dictionary maker in the above example might charge $12, and calculate 
that a $2 price cut would yield 1000 additional dictionary sales.  However, if the dictionary maker 
operated in both markets and tied the dictionary to the thesaurus, complementary products both sold at 
above cost, then a $2 price cut might yield 1000 additional dictionary sales plus 1000 additional thesaurus 
sales.  That is to say, the profit maximizing price would be lower when a single firm controlled both 
products and could tie them together.  This result could also come about if the sellers of the two products 
were separate but were able to coordinate their behavior.  They would jointly maximize by sharing both 
the output increase and the price reduction, as in the vertical integration context.  Note, however, that the 
gains accrue only by tying.  The seller does not prfit simply because he makes both dictionaries and 
thesauruses, but rather because the output increase in dictionaries attaches to thesauruses as well. 
A rule condemning tying in this situation would reduce both producer and consumers’ surplus 
unless the court also forced the firms to charge less than their individual profit-maximizing prices. One 
might assume that the dictionary maker could charge $12 for the dictionary and separately sell the 
thesaurus at the marginal cost price of $8. But that result would be no better than bundling, and the seller 
could not be expected to do it, because some buyers would purchase its thesaurus at the competitive price 
and then go elsewhere for their $12 dictionary.  That is to say, the lower price on the thesaurus is 
profitable only on the premise that the seller is obtaining the dictionary sell as well, and vice-versa. 
This result very likely explains many bundled discounts that occur in markets where the rival is 
operating in an oligopoly market and enjoying fairly high markups—a common characteristic of even 
modestly concentrated American markets.5 The firm making the two products sells them indiviually at 
                                                                                                                                                
Extensions of the Classic Case, 62 S. ECON. J. 567, 581–84 (1996); Michael Waterson, Vertical 
Integration, Variable Proportions and Oligopoly, 92 ECON. J. 129 (1982). 
 
3 For useful graphical and mathematical elaborations, see Parisi & Depoorter, supra note __. 
4See Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. POL. ECON. 347 (1950); 
Bruce H. Kobayashi, Does Economics Provide a Reliable Guide to Regulating Commodity Bundling by 
Firms? A Survey of the Economic Literature, 1 J. COMP. L. &  ECON. 707 (2005). 
 
5See Robert E. Hall, The Relation Between Price and Marginal Cost in U.S. Industry, 96 J. POL. 
ECON. 921 (1988). 
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the single-product oligopoly price, but bundles them at a profit maximizing price that is lower than the 
sum of the individual profit maximizing prices when offered by different firms.6 
Or consider a hypothetical situation resembling the on  in Jefferson Parish, where the Supreme 
Court approved a hospital-anesthesiologist tie.7  Suppose a dominant hospital required surgical services 
from anesthesiologists, a complementary product that was locally sold under conditions of oligopoly.  
Absent coordination both the hospital and the anesthesiologists would charge too high a price,  the output 
of surgery would accordingly be reduced and consumers harmed.  The hospital could negotiate a lower 
rate for anesthesiology services, however, if it promised a particular anesthesiologist to use its services 
exclusively.  Output would then rise to the “single monopoly” level, prices would fall, and the hospital, 
the anesthesiologist and its patients would all benefit.  This would be an instance of “reverse” leveraging, 
where tying caused a lower rather than higher price. 
Results similar to this are reasonably likely whenever both the tying and tied markets are subject 
to pricing above the competitive level and sufficient coordination between producers of the two products 
is unlikely—although even coordination would very like y take the form of tying.8 The markets need not 
be monopolized. As a result, the savings from elimination of double marginalization can apply to almost 
any market in which the tied product is not a commodity sold at the competitive price. In such markets the 
profit maximizing price of the tying monopolist is actually lower than that of two firms independently 
selling the tying and tied products.9 
 Ties that at first glance appear to be accompanied by price increases in the tying product can also 
be used to control double marginalization, although such arrangements appear to be far less common.  
Such ties are in fact two part tariffs, in which the seller charges a fixed price for one component and then 
sells a linked component at a competitive price.  For example, suppose a firm has significant market 
power in its fuel efficient car, which is best distributed by independent dealers, many of which have 
power in their local markets.  If the seller charges its monopoly price to the dealers they will asses a 
second markup to their customers, producing double marginalization, reduced output, and higher prices.  
Suppose, however, that the manufacturer builds the monopoly upcharge into a fixed franchise fee and 
then sells the cars to the dealers at the competitive price.  In this case the dealer will still take its markup, 
but that will reflect only its own power and not tha  of the manufacturer.  Further, because the franchise 
fee is a fixed cost to the dealer, the dealer can ear more by increasing the volume of cars sold in the time 
period covered by the fee.10  The term “tying” is apt because the manufacturer will not sell the cars at this 
                                                
6See, e.g., Masimo Corp. v. Tyco Health Care Grp., L.P., No. CV 02-4770 MRP, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 26916, at *27 (C.D. Cal. June 9, 2004) (plaintiff challenging defendant’s discount practices which 
included bundled discounts had profit margins of betwe n 45% and 83% during the period of claimed 
exclusion). The Ninth Circuit eventually entered an order finding liability on some claims but not others. 
Masimo Corp. v. Tyco Health Care Grp., L.P., 350 Fed. Appx. 95, 2009 WL 3451725 (9th Cir. Oct. 28, 
2009). 
 
7 Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466U.S. 2 (1984). 
 
8 For example, a dictionary maker and a thesaurus maker could sell packages jointly, agreeing on how 
to divide the surplus. 
9 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Harvard, Chicago and Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust Analysis, 
55 ANTITRUST BULL. 613 (2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1592476; Erik N. Hovenkamp & Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Competitive Harm, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 925 (2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1443284. 
10 See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 174–176 (1988), who notes that 
the theory is very general. See also David Gilo, Retail Competition Percolating Through to Suppliers and 
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price to those who have not paid the fee.  That is to say, the competitively priced cars are the tying 
product while the franchise fee is the tied product, which is the reverse of the usual claim in the franchise 
context.  The impact of tying in this case is higher output and lower car prices than would occur if the
manufacturer simply sold the cars at wholesale at its profit-maximizing price. 
  
 While the theory of double marginalization is generally thought to be robust, actual output effects 
in particular cases are generally impossible to measure.  As a general proposition, however, the theory 
shows that “linking” two monopolized markets by tying typically does not result in increased consumer or 
economic harm.  Indeed, it is much more likely to be beneficial.  Given the present state of analysis, we 
would not favor elimination of double marginalization as a defense to a tie that is objectionable on other 
grounds unless there is specific evidence that the tie r sults in greater output and that its results could not 
be duplicated in some less objectionable manner. 
Limiting Substitution of Inefficient Inputs 
Substitutes, including imperfect ones, limit the ability of a defendant to restrict output and to exploit 
customers. As it raises price above the competitive le l, even the sole supplier of an important product 
will induce some users to shift to the substitute; a  some point, additional price increases would sacrifice 
profits rather than increase them. Thus, such shifts, even to an inferior substitute, limit the detrimental 
price-output effects of the defendant's monopoly. At the same time, however, such shifts waste society's 
resources by increasing the production of goods that might not be produced at all when competitive prices 
prevail. 
Some ties can prevent these shifts and thus harmfully remove a constraint on monopoly pricing or 
beneficially eliminate a wasteful misallocation of resources. Unable to know whether society generally 
suffers or benefits from ties limiting input substitution, this function does not support general illegality or 
legality for tying. Because the net balance between th se harmful and beneficial tendencies is not likely to 
be resolved confidently in particular cases, limiting nput substitution should presumptively be ignored as 
a reason to condemn a tie that is otherwise lawful or to save one that is otherwise unlawful. 
To illustrate, suppose that in a competitive market a certain type of glue is made up of 50 percent D, a
drying agent, and 50 percent B, a bonding agent. Different proportions work somewhat less well, and in a 
competitive market B costs more than D, so the glue makers optimize with the 50-50 mix. But now 
suppose that D is monopolized, and the price is doubled. As a result, the glue makers would now prefer to 
make a glue that consists of 70 percent B and 30 percent D. This mix (1) would not be the consumers' first 
choice in a competitive market; and (2) represents a  inefficient allocation of resources in that it does not 
reflect the relative demand for these two products in a competitive market. 
At the same time, the altered mix reduces the demand for D, reducing the D monopolist's profits. That 
firm might then respond by (1) pre-mixing B and D in the original 50-50 mix and selling it only in that 
form—a form of “technological tie;”9 or (2) refusing to sell D unless buyers agreed to take all of their B 
                                                                                                                                                
the Use of Vertical Integration, Tying and Vertical Restraints to Stop it, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 25, 54 
(2003) (use of tying to limit double marginalization); Sreya Kolay & Greg Shaffer, Bundlng and Menus of 
Two-Part Tariffs, 51 J. IND. ECON. 383 (2003) (comparing bundling and two part tariffs).  Microsoft uses 
such a strategy to keep computer makers from assessing too high a markup on its Windows operating 
system.  See Michael P. Akemann, Microsoft’s Licensing Agreements: Theory and Evidence on the Sale 
of MS-DOS and Windows, 24 J. CORP. L. 553, 561 (1999). 
9 See 10 ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1757. A technological tie occurs when the tying vehicle is not a contract 
but rather a manufacturer-produced physical combinatio  of the two products. For example, a computer 
manufacturer wishing to tie its hardware to its software could either (1) use a contract to require each 
purchaser of one of its computers to buy a specified set of its programs; or (2) pre-load the software on 
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requirements from the seller as well at a monopoly rice designed to restore the attractiveness of the 50-
50 mix.10 
The two practices just described have the harmful ef ect of forcing buyers to take the full 50 percent 
of the monopolized drying agent, thus expanding the sal s of the monopolized product; but they also have 
the socially beneficial effect of restoring the product mix to that which it would be when both B and D 
were sold competitively.11 
But known instances of tying for this purpose are extremely rare. Further, determining whether the 
offsetting economic effects are on balance a gain or a l ss requires precise knowledge of the demand 
curves facing both products and the effects of substit tion on the demand for other products. No 
procedure for assessing net welfare effects is within the competence of the antitrust tribunal. This 
rationale thus serves neither to condemn ties that are otherwise lawful nor to save those that are othrwise 
unlawful, except perhaps in a very rare case in which the net effects are very clear. 
 
                                                                                                                                                
the computers' hard drives, set a package price, and refuse to sell computers without the pre-installed 
package. 
10 This would actually be a combination of tying and exclusive dealing. 
11For the relevant mathematics and diagrams, see ROGE  D. BLAIR &  DAVID L. KASERMAN, LAW 
AND ECONOMICS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND CONTROL (1983). 
